

Sent via Email
April 16, 2024

Charlie Baker
President, NCAA
P.O. Box 6222
Indianapolis, IN 46202-6222

Dear President Baker,

In response to the request for feedback on your December 2023 Project D1 proposal, the Knight Commission appreciates the opportunity to respond to your groundbreaking proposal and offers a number of recommendations and suggestions in the attached document that we believe can strengthen the proposal and address remaining challenges.

As a starting point, we applaud your letter to NCAA committee members, which states that the Project D1 proposal “kick-starts a long-overdue conversation among the membership that focuses on the differences that exist between schools, conferences and divisions and how to create more permissive and flexible rules across the NCAA that put student-athletes first.”

We commend both your taking the initiative to forthrightly address differences in Division I schools and conferences as well as the guiding principle of your proposals—to “put student-athletes first.” It’s never been more clear that the NCAA and Division I member institutions must develop a new model for college sports in which the education, health, safety, and opportunities for athletes are paramount.

This athlete-centric objective has, and continues to guide the Knight Commission’s efforts, most notably in the development of four major reports in our [“Transforming the D-I Model” series](#) over the last five years. Our far-reaching proposals in these reports address: the governance of FBS football; safeguards for creating robust NIL opportunities for athletes that are not thinly disguised forms of pay-for-play; reforms to bolster gender and racial equity; and, a set of guiding principles for a new financial framework for distributing national and conference shared athletics revenues to ensure that these growing revenues are better directed to athlete education, health, safety, and well-being.

These reports build on our independent organization’s legacy of influencing [transformational change to prioritize college athlete education, health, safety, and success](#). Indeed, we are proud that past efforts contributed to the record high graduation rates of Division I athletes today through reforms that created team academic thresholds for postseason competition and provided financial incentives for graduation success.

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We believe there are aspects of our recommendations that can serve as important complements to your Project D1 proposal. In other instances, we believe current realities will require even more change than the Project D1 proposal contemplates.

To best address your proposal and provide our feedback, the attached supplement provides an overview of our specific recommendations, pegged to individual elements of the Project D1 proposal.

We are eager to be helpful during this critical time for college sports and are glad to meet with you further to discuss this feedback. Thank you for your consideration.

Sincerely,



Pam Bernard
Co-Chair



Len Elmore
Co-Chair

cc: Division I Conference Commissioners
Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics Members
NCAA Division I Board of Directors
NCAA Division I Council
Projectd1@ncaa.org
Select NCAA Staff

Attachment

RESPONSE TO PROJECT D1

April 16, 2024

Project D1 advances some essential and potentially groundbreaking proposals to promote and protect college athlete well-being. At the same time, the Knight Commission believes that some promising Project D1 proposals may have unintended consequences that could limit athletic opportunities and that Project D1 does not address several major problems in Division I.

In particular, the Project D1 proposal fails to address the fundamental issue of the large gap between authority and accountability for FBS football and the related need for FBS football conferences and the College Football Playoff (CFP) to earmark billions of new CFP football revenue for college athlete education, health, safety, and well-being. In much the same vein, Project D1's proposals fall short of creating a different financial framework that will constrain runaway spending on FBS football coaches' salaries and severance payouts—expenses [that have grown two to three times as fast as spending on college athletes since the CFP began](#). The Knight Commission's recommendations described in this response provide alternative approaches to remedy these highly visible challenges to Division I college sports.

This document addresses five key areas:

- I. [Enhanced Educational Benefits](#)
- II. [Redirecting Revenues to College Athletes](#)
- III. [Correcting Inequities and Weaknesses in the Current National Incentive Structures of Division I Sports](#)
- IV. [Change in Division I Structure to Provide Expanded Autonomy](#)
- V. [Name, Image and Likeness \(NIL\)](#)

I. Enhanced Educational Benefits

Project D1 proposal: NCAA should “make it possible for all Division I colleges and universities to offer student-athletes any level of enhanced educational benefits they deem appropriate.”

Section I Key Points:

- Under *Alston*, institutions may provide more expansive, legitimate educational benefits to athletes than the package of benefits that most Division I schools currently offer making the Enhanced Educational Benefits recommendation possible today.
- The Commission supports institutions providing greater resources to enhance college athlete education and well-being.
- We encourage Division I conferences to establish a reasonable definition of “educational benefits” to guide their institutions.

We agree with the overarching proposal that the NCAA should “make it possible for all Division I colleges and universities to offer student-athletes any level of enhanced educational benefits they deem appropriate.” In fact, the SCOTUS ruling in *NCAA v. Alston* prohibits the NCAA from limiting educational benefits other than cash payments for “Graduation or Academic Awards,” or so-called “Alston Awards.” One immediate outcome of the SCOTUS decision was that many Division I institutions began providing these Academic Awards of up to \$5980 for each qualifying athlete. Typically, institutions require athletes to retain athletic eligibility, as defined by institutional and/or NCAA academic rules, to receive the academic award. Yet “Graduation and Academic Awards” are only one component of education benefits that are now permissible and cannot be limited by national rules.

Under *Alston*, institutions may provide more expansive, legitimate educational benefits to athletes than the package of benefits that most Division I schools currently offer. The Commission supports institutions providing greater resources to enhance college athlete education and well-being. We encourage Division I conferences to establish a reasonable definition of “educational benefits” to guide their institutions.

To take one example, an Autonomy institution or conference may currently offer a post-eligibility scholarship to a former college athlete toward the completion of an undergraduate or graduate degree at *any* school. However, it is unclear how many institutions have provided that scholarship support since the permissive legislation was adopted in 2021. Additionally, *Alston* could clear the way for more expansive coverage by Division I institutions or conferences of *any* graduate or professional educational costs that a former college athlete may wish to initiate. Before the *Alston* ruling, institutions could pay graduate education costs only if the athlete had remaining eligibility.

II. Redirecting Revenues to College Athletes

Project D1 proposal: “Institutions in a new subdivision will be required to invest \$30,000 per year into an enhanced educational trust fund for at least half of the institution’s eligible student-athletes.”

Section II Key Points:

- This Project D1 proposal, as written, could lead to reductions in athletics opportunities by creating financial disincentives to support a large roster of athletes. It could also negatively impact Olympic sports.
- To mitigate negative impacts, an alternative approach is to integrate components of this proposal with the Knight Commission’s C.A.R.E. 50% Benchmark for athlete-centric spending of shared revenues. That approach would provide more institutional accountability for athlete-centric spending and maintaining sport offerings:
 - Only 8 public institutions in Autonomy conferences currently achieve the C.A.R.E. 50% Benchmark.
 - With the CFP expansion and business-as-usual spending, by 2027, some institutions will spend an amount equal to **as little as 12 percent** of their shared athletics revenue on college athlete-centric areas.

The Commission supports the aim of this proposal to direct more revenues toward athlete-centric benefits. However, the Commission is concerned that the proposal, as written, could likely have an unintended negative impact on programs that offer broad-based sports opportunities and offer significantly more sports than other institutions. Under the Project D1 proposal, an athletics program with 800 athletes will have a much larger financial obligation than a program with 400 athletes.

At the same time, neither the current NCAA incentives nor any part of the Project D1 proposal contains meaningful financial incentives for institutions to offer opportunities in more than the minimum number of sports required for Division I membership, even though athletic opportunity is one of the NCAA’s core values.

Creating a financial disincentive for institutions to support a large roster of athletes, combined with a lack of counterbalancing incentives to maintain broad-based sports offerings, will likely result in some institutions paring down athletic opportunities. We have heard numerous concerns about this potential impact from Olympic sports leaders.

To reduce this negative impact, the Project D1 proposal could be modified or integrated with one of the financial responsibility approaches in our C.A.R.E. Model, (“[Connecting Athletics Revenues to the Educational Model of College Sports](#)”). Specifically, one of the C.A.R.E. Model’s proposed metrics for demonstrating financial responsibility (the “**C.A.R.E. 50% Benchmark**”) is to require that a program spend an amount equal to at least 50 percent of their “shared athletics revenues” on college athlete education, health, safety, and well-being. Shared athletics revenues are revenues generated by the NCAA, the College Football Playoff (CFP), or athletic conferences (collectively defined as “Revenue Distribution Entities”). These revenues are provided to conferences or directly to institutions.

A recent analysis shows that only [8 public institutions in Autonomy conferences \(ACC, Big Ten, Big 12, Pac-12, SEC\)](#) achieve this C.A.R.E. 50% Benchmark of spending an amount equal to at

least half of their shared athletics revenues on athlete education, health, safety, and well-being, with a median benchmark of 54 percent. Among the [44 public institutions in Autonomy conferences that fall short](#) of the C.A.R.E. 50% Benchmark, nearly two-thirds of them (27) had a C.A.R.E. ratio under 40 percent.

If long-standing spending trends continue, the huge influx of money that will flow to Autonomy institutions from an expanded CFP and new conference media contracts will cause these low C.A.R.E. Model ratios to drop drastically, particularly for institutions in the Big Ten and SEC. Projections show that by 2027, some institutions will spend an amount equal to *as little as 12 percent* of their shared athletics revenue on college athlete-centric areas (i.e., scholarships, cost of attendance stipends, medical and other direct benefits).

Recent Knight Commission reports detail Division I [institutional revenue and spending data for these metrics](#) and [provide projections](#) for the continuation of business-as-usual spending practices over the next decade. These data support that a different financial framework and/or requirements are needed to alter the entrenched course of athletics spending, particularly in the Autonomy conferences.

We propose that our C.A.R.E. 50% Benchmark—or some similar metric that prioritizes athlete-centric spending—be used as an initial filter to determine if the institutions will be required to invest \$30,000 annually in an educational trust fund for at least half of its athletes as Project D1 recommends. An alternative could be that institutions that meet the C.A.R.E. 50% Benchmark for athlete-centric spending would not be required to make the educational trust fund investments but would instead operate under permissive legislation that allows the institution to provide such funding to any number of athletes at the school's discretion, so long as that funding complies with Title IX.

III. Correcting Inequities and Weaknesses in the Current National Incentive Structures of Division I Sports

Project D1 does not address the NCAA or the CFP's incentive structure.

Section III Key Points:

- The overall impact of Project D1 can be strengthened by incorporating overdue reforms to remedy inequities in the incentive structure and elevate the importance of sports other than FBS football and men's basketball.
- The NCAA must alter its athletics performance incentives to make them gender equitable as required by the NCAA's Constitution. [The Commission proposes fixing this inequity by](#) providing equal incentives/rewards for athletics success for men's and women's teams.
- The sport of FBS football should no longer be counted in the NCAA's revenue distribution formula since the NCAA doesn't conduct its national championship or control revenue from the sport. FBS football is the only sport that has a revenue distribution plan separate from the NCAA through an entity that conducts its national championship, the CFP.
- Our proposals would significantly boost the importance of athletic opportunities for hundreds of thousands of college athletes in NCAA championship sports that are the backbone of our [nation's Olympic efforts](#).
- A number of conferences are showing they want to align conference incentives with the core values of education, gender equity, and opportunity by implementing our C.A.R.E. Model principles.

As our C.A.R.E. Model report emphasizes, we believe that incentives in revenue distribution should reflect the values of higher education and the NCAA itself. Financial incentives in college sports revenue distributions should be grounded in foundational principles of athlete education, health, safety, well-being, equity, and opportunity. Unfortunately, in too many cases, that is not the case today.

The overall impact of Project D1 can be strengthened by adding elements that will both remedy the current inequities in the incentive structure and elevate the importance of sports other than FBS football and men's basketball.

While these issues may seem to be different than the core purpose of Project D1, which is designed to provide more money to athletes, the issues are related since elements of Project D1 may encourage institutions to cut back on providing opportunities in non-revenue generating sports.

As noted earlier, we have concerns that the proposed educational trust fund investments could disincentivize institutions from maintaining broad-based sports programming. Our C.A.R.E. Model proposal addresses this issue by requiring any Revenue Distribution Entity that provides athletic performance incentives (e.g., NCAA, CFP, or athletic conferences) to also provide financial incentives for broad-based opportunities at an equal dollar level, at a minimum. While the NCAA revenue distribution formula does incentivize sports opportunities, its impact is

skewed and weakened because of the [exaggerated weight given to the sport of FBS football](#) within the NCAA's formula.

To correct the inequities created by incentives in current revenue distributions, the Knight Commission has proposed two straightforward and overdue reforms:

1. The NCAA must alter its [athletics performance incentives/rewards to be gender equitable](#). Specifically, it should correct its current gender inequity by providing equal incentives/rewards for the athletics success of men's and women's teams. The NCAA currently rewards conferences for the success (postseason appearances and victories) of only the [men's basketball teams](#) in the NCAA March Madness Tournaments. While the NCAA has announced that it is exploring offering incentives for similar tournament success in women's basketball, the approach appears to be limited in ways that do not meet the principle of gender equity in the NCAA's Constitution. The NCAA's apparent plan to tie future financial incentives for women's basketball tournament success to an assigned value in its new multisport media contract falls well short of righting this longstanding inequity. Moreover, Division I leadership has taken far too long to act – nearly three years have passed since the independent Kaplan Hecker & Fink [report](#) commissioned by the NCAA recommended correcting this glaring inequity.
2. The sport of FBS football should no longer be counted in the NCAA's revenue distribution formula, since, unlike all other NCAA sports, the NCAA does not operate the FBS football championship and receives no revenue from the sport. The CFP's separate FBS-only shared revenue is the exclusive, no-strings-attached revenue distribution plan for the sport of FBS football. By eliminating the sport of football from counting in the NCAA's revenue distribution, [more than \\$60 million could be reallocated annually](#). Additionally, this simple change would mean that the Olympic sports, for which the NCAA conducts championships, are accorded greater value in the association's revenue distribution.

Our recommendations would significantly boost the importance of education and athletic opportunities for hundreds of thousands of college athletes in *all* NCAA championship sports. These sports are essential to the NCAA's mission and are the backbone of our [nation's Olympic efforts](#).

The Commission [will continue to work with Division I conferences](#) to implement the C.A.R.E. Model principles to align conference financial incentives with the core values of education, gender equity, and opportunity. If a critical mass of Division I conferences adopt the C.A.R.E. Model or a similar incentive structure for revenue distributions and spending, it could be invaluable in creating a model of college athletics that is both easier to defend in court and that provides greater support for college athletes.

IV. Change in Division I Structure to Provide Expanded Autonomy

Project D1 proposal: Create a new subdivision of the highest resourced institutions that would have the educational trust fund investment obligation and have autonomy to develop rules in a “wide range of policies, such as scholarship commitment and roster size, recruitment, transfers or NIL.”

Section IV Key Points:

- Project D1’s proposed new subdivision appears to provide expanded autonomy to a subgroup of schools that already has substantial authority to modify rules.
- A more effective solution is the [Knight Commission’s proposal for the sport of FBS football](#), and FBS football only, to have its own, new governance structure, funded by the CFP and operated separately from the NCAA.
 - The sport of FBS football will benefit from a single leadership structure.
 - The NCAA will benefit by concentrating on the sports for which it conducts a championship.
 - This new structure would finally couple FBS football revenue administration authority with rules administration.
 - Support for this overhaul is growing among Division I administrators, including FBS athletics directors.
- Both governing entities must include independent experts and athletes on their boards.

An overarching concern with Project D1 expanding autonomy is that more autonomy may result in only incremental change. In 2015, the ACC, Big 12, Big Ten, PAC-12, and SEC were granted a significant legislative opportunity to create their own rules in a number of areas (i.e., Bylaw 9.2.2). After [several years of using that autonomy to create new benefits for college athletes](#), the Autonomy conferences have not used this broad provision to address the current and most pressing issues. It is unclear how the Project D1 proposal differs from the legislative structure that already exists.

Instead, the Knight Commission continues to stand by [its recommendations for a fundamental transformation of the structure and governance of big-revenue football](#), with corresponding changes in the governance and structure of the NCAA. The sport of FBS football, and FBS football only, should have its own, new governance structure, funded by CFP revenues. This change would benefit the sport of FBS football, providing a single leadership structure to couple authority of national revenue administration (CFP) with authority over rules administration.

We believe that a separate governance structure for the sport of FBS football only is the first major step that must be taken to recognize the extraordinary commercial success of many Autonomy football programs. This proposed structure will enable the development of more tailored approaches to meet the realities of these programs, which so powerfully propel both public understanding and misunderstanding of all Division I sports.

The recently announced CFP media deal, which would begin in 2026, provides the appropriate time for this transition to occur. With an annual contract that will exceed \$1.3 billion, the independently operated CFP will generate more annual revenue than the NCAA’s March Madness tournaments. Yet remarkably, the NCAA receives no money from the sport of FBS football, even though the NCAA and all its member institutions absorb the national costs of FBS football (e.g., catastrophic health insurance, rules enforcement, legal expenses).

A separate FBS football-centric structure would also provide important administrative and financial benefits to the NCAA in several respects. It would:

1. Help the NCAA to achieve Project D1’s goal to maintain “the existing NCAA national championship model across all existing Division I sports...”
2. Allow the NCAA to better support and concentrate on the sports for which it conducts championships and for the sports that bind NCAA institutions together.
3. Provide a better approach for the NCAA to handle mounting legal liabilities and antitrust challenges. In our view, the NCAA should reexamine its responsibility to all of its member institutions and should no longer accept legal liability for a sport for which it does not operate a championship nor control any of the sport’s revenue. The Commission raised these issues [in 2021 to the NCAA’s Constitution Committee](#) and also offered an [independent antitrust legal review of the impact of our proposed structure](#).
4. Provide additional financial benefits beyond releasing the NCAA from legal costs for the sport of FBS football. With a separate entity to govern the sport of FBS football, the NCAA would no longer absorb the sport’s national operating costs, which LEAD1 (the FBS Athletics Directors Association) estimated at [\\$65 million annually during their review of related issues in September 2022](#). [Note: By combining these estimated national costs with the \$60 million in revenue distribution savings from eliminating FBS football factors from the NCAA revenue distribution formula (as described in Section III, Item 2 above), the NCAA could reallocate more than \$120 million annually.]

Our proposal does not require the dismantling of any FBS multisport conference, but [could lead to changes in the NCAA structure to better facilitate competitive affiliations for sports other than FBS football](#). This change could lessen the travel burdens on athletes while still maintaining elite, competitive opportunities. That tailored and enhanced flexibility would have an enduring positive impact on the experience of athletes who participate in sports other than FBS football.

A final, important point: Our proposed new FBS football entity would also include meaningful football athlete representation and independent directors to provide unbiased and expert input. New representation in the governance of the sport could include medical experts, former FBS football players, former head coaches, and other independent voices.

This recommendation stems from our [long-standing belief that the governance of all college sports would benefit from independent leadership](#). The Rice Commission Report on College Basketball captured the governance issue succinctly in 2018 when it wrote:

“The NCAA administers what is effectively a public trust in the United States — athletic competition among college athletes. Public members of boards serve important functions. They provide objectivity, fresh perspectives and independent viewpoints and judgments. Many non-profit associations utilize public board members for precisely these reasons. The NCAA Board needs excellent public members, with the benefits that such members provide...”

Unfortunately, in 2018, the NCAA implemented this Rice Commission recommendation only in the narrowest way by adding a few independent members to the NCAA Board of Governors,

which has no authority over Division I operating rules and no authority over the governance of FBS football.

We raise this to emphasize the essential importance of independent directors in the governance of college sports and on the boards that have the greatest authority and impact. The governance of the sport of FBS football needs expert, independent leaders who will make decisions based on the best interest of football players and the long-term future of the sport—and not just on securing financial advantages for their particular conferences, which dominated recent decision-making.

Support for a substantial change in the leadership of FBS football is widespread and growing among FBS Athletics Directors. A November 2023 survey by [Athletic Director U \(ADU\)](#) found that more than 70 percent of respondents favored a different leadership structure for the sport. The support for a structural overhaul builds on the consensus support for a different leadership structure that the [FBS Athletics Directors Association \(LEAD1\) documented in its Dec. 2022 report](#) to the NCAA, which called for a change in the sport’s governance within the NCAA.

NCAA Division I Governance Composition

To maintain college sports as a “public trust,” we believe more significant governance composition changes are also needed to the NCAA’s Division I governance. As [the Knight Commission has previously communicated, and as emphasized above](#), it is essential for the Division I board to add independent directors to the current board governance, including at least one expert on college athlete health and safety. The board should also add a greater representation of college athletes. While, as noted above, we have concerns about the proposed new Division I subdivision, if such a subdivision is created, then independent directors should be part of its separate governance process.

V. Name, Image and Likeness (NIL)

Project D1 proposal: Rules should change for any Division I school, at their choice, to enter into name, image and likeness licensing opportunities with their student-athletes.

Section V Key Points:

- The Knight Commission fully supports permitting athletes to receive compensation from third parties for the legitimate use of their NIL.
- This Project D1 proposal appears to allow institutions to directly provide NIL compensation to college athletes without any limits. Under this arrangement, institutions would, in effect, assign NIL monetary values to each college athlete.
- If the intent of this proposal is to allow institutions to directly compensate athletes, then a more comprehensive approach to athlete compensation is warranted.
- If the aim is to gain control of NIL Collectives and address equity in NIL compensation, then a different approach altogether may provide better results.
- Significant questions about NIL should be answered in any further refinement of this Project D1 proposal.

The Knight Commission fully supports permitting athletes to receive compensation from third parties for the legitimate use of their NIL, just as all non-athletes on campus are permitted to do. The Project D1 proposal, however, appears to go well beyond permitting arms-length NIL deals with third parties by allowing institutions to directly provide NIL compensation to college athletes without any limits. Under this arrangement, institutions would, in effect, assign NIL monetary values to each college athlete.

It appears that allowing institutions to directly provide unlimited NIL compensation to athletes will lead to a thinly disguised form of “pay for play” rather than legitimate NIL deals. It also appears that this proposal would open the door for institutions to use NIL compensation as part of the full institutional package to recruit athletes.

The Knight Commission requests clarity about whether the intent of the recommended NIL approach is to use NIL as a way for institutions to directly compensate athletes, or if the NCAA is trying to corral the impact of NIL Collectives and address the significant gender inequities in NIL compensation that Collectives currently provide. If the former is the intent, then a more comprehensive approach to athlete compensation is warranted. If the aim is to gain control of NIL Collectives and address equity, then a different approach altogether may provide better results.

For example, increased transparency and reporting requirements, particularly for NIL Collectives that receive promotional support or funding from an institution, should be a focus of any reforms to address the NIL inequities among Collectives. California Senate Bill 906 (Helping Achieve Equity in College Sports NIL) offers helpful concepts.

In April 2020, fifteen months prior to a change in NIL rules, the [Knight Commission proposed NIL guidelines](#) that would provide both fairness to athletes to pursue non-institutional NIL compensation and sufficient guardrails to prevent NIL deals from becoming pay-for-play and improper recruiting inducements. These guidelines emphasized reporting requirements and recommended independent oversight of NIL regulations. The Commission’s principles and guidelines influenced the [Uniform Law Commission’s College Athlete’s Name, Image, or](#)

[Likeness Act](#), which was adopted July 14, 2021 to provide a potential framework for legislation. While we recognize many issues have arisen since that time that would preclude the NCAA from simply adopting all of those proposed guidelines, we believe our principles—and similar principles in the ULC Act—can still be adopted to protect the NIL rights of college athletes and integrity of college sports.

We have several additional concerns and questions regarding the Project D1 proposal allowing institutions to enter into NIL deals with athletes. They include:

1. Project D1 proposes that a new subdivision be created for the highest-resourced institutions and that this subdivision can develop its own rules in areas like NIL. If this special subdivision has the autonomy to make different NIL rules, why is it necessary to allow all Division I institutions to pay athletes directly for NIL with no apparent limitations?
2. One stated reason for allowing institutional NIL compensation is to require schools to abide by gender equity regulations, even though the NCAA currently does not enforce Title IX. Will the NCAA take on any new enforcement responsibilities or monitoring to ensure gender equity compliance for NIL compensation?
3. With respect to increasing reporting and transparency around NIL deals, if institutions are allowed to enter into NIL deals directly with college athletes, will NIL compensation provided by the institution to athletes be reported on NCAA Financial Report forms and treated as an athletics department expense like all other current athlete benefits?
 - Reporting of institutional compensation for NIL deals would create greater public transparency for public institutions, which are subject to FOIA requests. However, institutional NIL compensation to athletes made by private institutions would not be subject to FOIA. Would the Project DI proposal require public transparency of NIL compensation made by private institutions?
4. Does the NCAA envision that NIL compensation paid by the institution will be taxable income to the athlete?

As an independent group that helped lead other transformational reforms prioritizing athletes' education and well-being, the Commission hopes this feedback is useful during the most dynamic period in the history of college sports. We stress that while our proposals are grounded in core educational principles, they have been well-researched and are reflective of feedback and insights gained through detailed surveys of Division I leaders.

As emphasized earlier, we agree with the sentiment that college sports “is a public trust.” There is much at stake in the decisions moving forward. We would welcome the opportunity to discuss further any or all of our input and recommendations.